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Abstract: We investigate the intraday effects of intra-marginal intervention in a 
horizontal band on the exchange rate spread. Official intraday data on Danish 
intervention transactions in the ERM II, the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Union, facilitates our analysis. We show that intervention purchases and sales both exert 
a significant influence on the exchange rate spread, but in opposite directions. 
Intervention purchases of the small currency, on average, narrow the spread while 
intervention sales of the small currency, on average, widen the spread. This is a novel 
finding that differs from those of existing studies that find intervention always widens the 
exchange rate spread and increases market uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies have investigated the intraday effects of foreign exchange intervention.
1
 
Few studies have examined the intraday effects of intervention using accurate, official 
intraday intervention data.
2
 Even fewer studies have analyzed the intraday effects of 
intervention on exchange rate spreads. These studies examine the spread effects of 
intervention in a crawling peg (Melvin, Menkhoff and Schmeling 2009) and the spread 
effects of intervention in floating exchange rates (Chari 2007 and Pasquariello 2007).
3
 
All of these studies find that foreign exchange intervention is associated with an intraday 
increase in the bid-ask exchange rate spread. 
In this paper we investigate how unannounced intra-marginal intervention in a 
horizontal band such as the ERM II, the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European 
Union, influences the bid-ask exchange rate spread. Official intraday data on intervention 
transactions in the Danish Krone-Euro (DKK/EUR) market provided by Danmarks 
Nationalbank (DN), the Danish central bank, facilitates our analysis.
4
  
                                                 
1
 See Humpage (2003), Menkhoff (2010), Neely (2005) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for surveys of the 
intervention literature. 
2
 The Bank of Canada, Danmarks Nationalbank, and  the Swiss National Bank are the only central banks to 
provide access to lengthy records of time-stamped intervention data. Records of time-stamped interventions 
(spanning 1986 to 1995) by the Swiss National Bank are the only publicly available intraday intervention 
data. See Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) for an early contribution that uses official Swiss intraday 
intervention data to analyze the effects of announced intervention on the level of the exchange rate. See 
Fatum and King (2005) for a study of the intraday effects of Canadian interventions. 
3
 Melvin, Menkhoff and Schmeling (2009) present a case study of 5 days of intervention by the Russian 
Central Bank. Chari (2007) uses newswire reports in lieu of actual Bank of Japan intraday intervention data 
and analyzes a period of roughly one year. Pasquariello (2007) analyzes 9 years of official Swiss intraday 
intervention data. 
4
 In ERM II, a bilateral central rate and a horizontal deviation band is set for the currency of the 
participating country vis-à-vis the EUR, but not against the currency of other member states. Only if the 
currency reaches either the upper or the lower limit of the deviation band is the European Central Bank 
(ECB)  obligated to intervene. The official ERM II deviation band for the DKK is +/- 2.25 percent around 
the official Danish ERM II central rate of 7.46038 DKK/EUR. During the period under study the DKK 
traded within a narrower range and was consistently appreciated relative to the official central rate. All 
interventions in the DKK/EUR rate have been carried out unilaterally by the DN. See DN (2003), ECB 
(2004), and Fatum and Pedersen (2009) for details on ERM II and the Danish exchange rate policy. 
 3 
It is interesting to investigate how the exchange rate spread is influenced by 
intervention since doing so can reveal if intervention increases or reduces foreign 
exchange market uncertainty regarding whether a currency is seen as properly priced.
5
 It 
is particularly interesting to analyze the effects of intervention on exchange rate spreads 
using the Danish intervention data for three reasons. First, the Danish intervention data 
presents a very rare opportunity for learning about the influence of intervention on 
exchange rate spreads using official, time-stamped data provided by a currently 
intervening central bank.
6
 Second, no previous study has analyzed the effects of 
intervention in a horizontal band, such as the ERM II band, on exchange rate spreads. 
Third, analyzing the Danish experience of intra-marginal interventions in the horizontal 
ERM II band can bring insights of relevance to Denmark and to other EU member states 
currently participating in the ERM II as well as to the EU member states that are not in 
the Euro-zone and are not participating in the ERM II, but are expected to participate in 
ERM II at a later date in order to fulfill the exchange rate criterion necessary for adopting 
the EUR.
7
 
In our context of unannounced intervention by a small central bank aimed at 
maintaining a small currency in a horizontal band around a major currency, such as 
maintaining the DKK against the EUR in the ERM II, we cannot assume that the effects 
of intervention purchases and sales are necessarily symmetric and that foreign exchange 
                                                 
5
 Empirical evidence shows that bid-ask spreads widen when uncertainty increases. See, for example, 
Bollerslev and Melvin (1994). See Chari (2007) for a useful discussion of intervention and exchange rate 
spreads in a microstructure context. 
6
 Hitherto Danish intraday intervention data has only been analyzed by Fatum and Pedersen (2009) who 
study the intraday effects of intervention on the exchange rate level; they do not consider the influence of 
intervention on the exchange rate spread. 
7
 Denmark, Latvia and Lithuania are currently in ERM II. Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have not adopted the EUR and do not participate in ERM II. 
Denmark and the United Kingdom are the only EU member states with a formal exemption clause (“opt-
out”) according to which adoption of the EUR is not obliged. 
 4 
intervention is always associated with an intraday increase in the bid-ask exchange rate 
spread.
8
 First, it is reasonable to assume that as the intervention occurs, foreign exchange 
market customers observe only a large order flow but cannot discern the origin of the 
trade.
9
 Therefore, an unannounced intervention by the small central bank, whether a sale 
or a purchase, is initially understood by customers only as a large trade and, accordingly, 
interpreted as informative regarding pressure, either upwards or downwards, on the small 
currency. An unannounced intervention by the small central bank, however, is unlikely to 
be interpreted as informative regarding pressure on the large currency.
10
  
Second, downward pressure on a currency in a horizontal band is potentially more 
concerning than upward pressure, especially if the downward pressure adversely affects 
the credibility of the currency and its exchange rate regime.
11
 This concern is particularly 
relevant for the DKK, which has a relatively recent history of instability and frequent 
devaluations prior to participation in the ERM I, the predecessor of the ERM II. The fact 
                                                 
8
 The empirical intervention literature in general pays limited attention to the possibility that the effects of 
intervention might be asymmetric across intervention purchases and intervention sales. Oftentimes 
estimated models implicitly and a priori impose symmetry across purchases and sales by simply not 
distinguishing between the two, or by analyzing data sets encompassing only interventions in one direction. 
For example, of the aforementioned three existing studies of the intraday effects of intervention on the 
exchange rate spread, only Pasquariello (2007) analyzes intervention data encompassing both intervention 
purchases and intervention sales. 
9
 The dealers, i.e. the commercial bank counterparts to the DN, are explicitly requested not to disseminate 
information regarding the origin of the DN initiated intervention trades to their customers. See 
Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), Ghosh (2002), and others for the advantages of unannounced 
interventions. 
10
 A large sale of the small currency by the small central bank against the large currency might indicate that 
the small currency is overvalued and subject to downward pressure, possibly leading to uncertainty 
regarding the sustainability of the exchange rate regime. By contrast, a large purchase of the large currency 
by the small central bank against the small currency would not necessarily imply that there is upward 
pressure on the large currency since there are plenty of currencies other than this particular small currency 
against which pressure on the large currency can be levied. 
11
 Intervention purchases of the domestic currency are, in principle, restricted by the amount of finite 
foreign exchange reserves at the disposal of the small country, whereas intervention sales are, in principle, 
unrestricted as the monetary authority of the small country has the capability to print money to sell against 
the large currency. However, the ECB is obligated to intervene if an ERM II currency reaches a deviation 
band limit, thereby effectively lifting the finite amount restriction of foreign exchange reserves held by the 
ERM II member state. 
 5 
that the DKK is continuously maintained at an appreciated rate relative to the central rate 
corroborates that downward pressure is viewed as more concerning than upward pressure. 
Reduced credibility will manifest itself in the form of increased uncertainty and thus a 
widening of the exchange rate spread. By contrast, a large purchase of the small currency 
may be interpreted as a confirmation of the credibility of the small currency and the 
exchange rate regime, thereby leading to reduced uncertainty and thus a narrowing of the 
exchange rate spread. In other words, the effects of unannounced intervention in a 
horizontal band could be asymmetric across purchases and sales. 
To assess the intraday effects of intervention on the exchange rate spread in the 
horizontal ERM II band, and to formally test whether intervention purchases and 
intervention sales influence the spread asymmetrically, we estimate time-series models of 
the DKK/EUR exchange rate bid-ask spread, calculated from indicative 5-minute spot bid 
and ask DKK/EUR prices purchased from Olsen and Associates, with intervention 
purchases and sales entering as separate explanatory variables. Our sample covers the 1 
August 2002 to 31 December 2004 period. We carry out our baseline estimations using 
OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and 
covariances. As a methodological robustness test we also estimate models using the 
weighted least squares (WLS) procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). 
Consistent with the existing studies of the intraday effects of intervention on the 
exchange rate spread in the context of a crawling peg or floating exchange rates, our 
results confirm that intervention significantly influences the spread. However, in contrast 
with these studies, we show that interventions in a horizontal band do not necessarily 
increase the spread. Instead, we show that intervention purchases of the small currency, 
 6 
on average, reduce the spread, while only intervention sales, on average, increase the 
spread. This finding conforms to the suggestion that uncertainty in the market regarding 
the exchange rate decreases when interventions can be interpreted as upward pressure on 
the small currency, while uncertainty in the market increases when interventions can be 
interpreted as downward pressure on the small currency. Our results hold up against an 
array of robustness checks, including employing a different econometric procedure and 
controlling for coincidental arrival of macro news. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the 
traditional intervention transmission channels and their relevance to the Danish 
interventions. Sections 3 and 4 present the data and the empirical model, respectively. 
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 presents several robustness checks. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Transmission Channels and Danish Interventions 
The intervention literature has identified the signaling channel, the coordination channel, 
the portfolio balance channel, and the noise-trading channel as possible transmission 
channels through which sterilized intervention might work. This section briefly outlines 
key elements of each of these four traditional intervention transmission channels and their 
relevance in the particular context of the DN interventions.
12
 
The idea of the signaling channel hypothesis is that by carrying out intervention 
the central bank informs the market, or sends a signal, about its future monetary policy 
intentions. Assuming that financial markets are forward-looking and monetary policy is a 
                                                 
12
 For detailed discussions of the transmission channels see Mussa (1981) regarding the signaling channel, 
Edison (1993) regarding the signaling and the portfolio-balance channels, Sarno and Taylor (2001) 
regarding the coordination channel, and Hung (1997) regarding the noise-trading channel. 
 7 
foreign exchange rate determinant, information about future monetary policy can then 
influence current exchange rates. In order for intervention to send a signal, and thus for 
the functioning of the signaling channel, intervention must be announced or detected by 
the market (where market detection implies that an intervention is indeed understood to 
be an intervention carried out by the central bank rather than incorrectly perceived as a 
privately initiated trade). 
The coordination channel pertains to a situation of substantial exchange rate 
misalignment and coordination failure to the extent that individual market participants are 
hesitant to risk betting on a reversal of the exchange rate towards its equilibrium. In such 
a situation the coordination channel proposes that announced or detected intervention can 
take on a coordinating role that organizes fundamentalist traders to enter the market at the 
same time, thereby causing the exchange rate to adjust. In order for intervention to send a 
coordinating signal, and thus for the functioning of the coordination channel, intervention 
must be announced or detected by the market.  
The portfolio balance channel relies on foreign and domestic assets (bonds) being 
imperfect substitutes. The intervention changes the relative supplies of these assets and 
leads to a market-clearing change in relative asset returns in order for investors to 
demand both foreign and domestic assets. The portfolio balance channel then suggests 
that the change in relative asset returns, in the absence of changes in relative nominal 
interest rates, is generated by an adjustment of the current exchange rate.  
According to the noise-trading channel monetary authorities intervening against 
strong exchange rate momentum must intervene secretly to achieve an increase in short-
term exchange rate volatility in order to manipulate non-fundamentalist traders (i.e. 
 8 
noise-traders, or chartists) to second-guess the strength and duration of the (from the 
perspective of the monetary authorities) undesirable exchange rate trend. Consequently, 
in order for intervention to work through the noise-trading channel, intervention must be 
unannounced as well as undetected.  
As noted earlier, the DN interventions are unannounced and, as discussed in the 
next section, rarely reported in the newswire services. Therefore, it seems improbable 
that the DN interventions would influence the DKK/EUR through either the signaling or 
the coordination channels, i.e. the two channels that rely on market awareness in order for 
intervention to be influential. There is no similar reason to dismiss the possibility that the 
DN interventions are effective through the portfolio-balance channel (the portfolio-
balance channel does not require interventions to be announced or detected in order to 
function). However, this channel does not consider the effects of intervention on market 
uncertainty, and it does not explain the possibility of asymmetric effects of intervention. 
In our context of investigating the effects of intervention on the exchange rate spread, and 
whether these effects are asymmetric across intervention purchases and sales, the 
portfolio-balance channel, therefore, is of limited interest. By contrast, the noise-trading 
channel, which pertains only to secret interventions, i.e. interventions that are both 
unannounced and undetected, seems particularly relevant in our context. Although the 
noise-trading channel suggests that secret interventions work by increasing exchange rate 
volatility and does not explicitly consider the possible influence of intervention on 
exchange rate spreads, it seems reasonable to equate exchange rate volatility and 
exchange rate spreads in the sense that both can be interpreted as measures of market 
uncertainty. In doing so it is clear that the DN interventions must necessarily increase the 
 9 
bid-ask DKK/EUR spread in order for any effects of the DN interventions on the value of 
the DKK to be consistent with the transmission mechanism described by the noise-
trading channel. We discuss our empirical findings in light of the noise-trading channel at 
the end of Section 5. 
 
3. Data 
The intervention data covers all DN interventions in the DKK/EUR market over the 1 
August 2002 to 31 December 2004 period.
13
 The data includes the exact amount and 
time-stamp to the nearest minute obtained directly from the trade-sheet of each 
intervention transaction. Intervention amounts are quoted in EUR and a positive amount 
denotes a purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK.
14
  
Table 1A displays descriptive statistics of the intervention data, and Figure 1 
shows the interventions juxtaposed against the DKK/EUR exchange rate. Our sample 
consists of a total of 73 intervention days, encompassing a total of 162 intervention 
transactions. On intervention days, the average daily intervention amount is EUR 155 
million, which is roughly 8% of the average daily turnover in the DKK/EUR market.
15
 
                                                 
13
 The sample period is determined by data availability. 
14
 In accordance with the ERM II provisions, the DN trader conducting an intervention operation is 
required to write the amount and the exact time of the operation on the trade-sheet immediately after the 
completion of each individual intervention transaction. This information is forwarded to the ECB by the 
end of the trading day, at the latest. Our intraday intervention data consists of this extremely reliable 
information. 
15
 Average daily turnover in the DKK/EUR market was USD 2,236 million in 2004, or roughly EUR 1,900 
million when converted at the prevailing USD/EUR rate of 1.2. See BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey of 
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2004, http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.htm 
Statistical Annex Table E.6, pp 61, for statistics on average daily turnover in the DKK/EUR market. 
 10 
The DN follows standard central bank practice in not announcing its 
interventions. Furthermore, the DN interventions are rarely reported in the newswire 
services and none of the reports mentions amount or timing of the interventions.
16
 
The high-frequency DKK/EUR exchange rate data is provided by Olsen and 
Associates. The data consists of the bid and the offer spot exchange rate at the end of 
every 5-minute interval over every 24-hour period. The quotes are indicative quotes, i.e. 
not necessarily traded quotes. We follow Dacorogna, Müller, Nagler, Olsen and Pictet 
(1993) and filter the data for anomalies and bad quotes.
17
 Table 1B summarizes key 
statistical properties of our 5-minute bid-ask exchange rate spreads (defined as ask minus 
bid). Figure 2 shows the average intraday spread across the intervals of the day. 
There is virtually no trading of the Danish currency outside of standard Danish 
business hours (see DN 2003 and ECB 2004), thus we define a trading day in the Danish 
currency market to start at 8.00 GMT+1 and finish at 17.00 GMT+1.
18
 Consequently, our 
analysis considers a total of 603 trading days consisting of a total of 64383 5-minute 
DKK/EUR exchange rate bid-ask spreads.
19
 Importantly, our trading day definition 
encompasses all intervention transactions during the period under study. 
                                                 
16
 A Factiva search for both English and Danish language newswire reports of DN interventions over the 
August 2002 to December 2004 period, using various search word combinations such as “Danish 
intervention”, “Danmarks Nationalbank”, and “Danish Crown” etc., finds only four intervention reports in 
total (three English language reports from Reuters News and one Danish language report from a Danish 
daily newspaper). The reports are available upon request. 
17
 Superior transactions bid and ask prices are not available for the DKK/EUR exchange rate market for the 
period under study. For this reason we refrain from assessing the economic significance implied by the 
coefficient estimates when discussing the estimation results in Section 5. See Danielsson and Payne (2002) 
for a detailed comparison of indicative quotes to transactions data. 
18
 This definition of a trading day carries over naturally to a definition of a weekend, i.e. we define a 
weekend to start at 17.05 GMT+1 Friday and finish at 8.00 GMT+1 Monday. 
19
 We also deleted the following holidays from the analysis: 1 January, Easter (three holidays), Christmas 
(24/25/26 December), 31 December as well as four Denmark-specific holidays (Store Bededag, Kristi 
Himmelfartsdag, Anden Pinsedag, and Grundlovsdag).  
 11 
Danish and Euro-Area interest rates are obtained from the websites of DN 
(www.nationalbanken.dk) and the ECB (www.ecb.int), respectively. Time-stamped 
Danish, German, and Euro-area macro announcements and preceding survey expectations 
are obtained from Bloomberg. Summary statistics regarding interest rates and macro 
news are available from the authors upon request. 
 
4. The Empirical Model 
We follow Melvin, Menkhoff and Schmeling (2009) and use OLS with 
heteroskedasticity- and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) errors to model the exchange 
rate spread, SPt, as a linear function of (absolute) intervention, It, and lagged values of the 
spread itself: 
(1) 

 
J
j
ttjtjt TtISPSP
1
00 ...1,  
As noted earlier, T=64383. We choose J=6 based on the Schwartz and Akaike 
information criteria. We test for delayed effects of intervention and control for macro 
news in the robustness section. 
This preliminary specification ignores the possibility of asymmetric effects across 
(absolute) intervention purchases, (I
P
t), and (absolute) intervention sales, (I
S
t). To allow 
for the possibility of asymmetries we estimate the following model: 
(2) 

 
J
j
tt
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We include as additional explanatory variables the distance from parity, i.e. a 
measure of the distance between the DKK/EUR exchange rate and the central rate, the 
EUR-DKK interest rate differential, as well as lags (two and six, respectively) of the 5-
 12 
minute exchange rate volatility. We use the absolute value of the residual of the 
conditional mean model of the exchange rate return, as estimated in Fatum and Pedersen 
(2009), as a proxy for the 5-minute exchange rate volatility.
20
 
The distance from parity and the interest rate differential variables are 
insignificant.
21
 The inclusion of lags of volatility improves the overall fit of the model, 
but the significance level and size of the coefficient estimates of the lags of the spread are 
affected by this inclusion (due to multicollinearity between spread and volatility). The 
results with respect to significance of the intervention variables are unchanged regardless 
of whether or not lags of volatility are included in the estimations. As a result, we exclude 
these additional explanatory variables from the rest of the analysis. Results with the 
additional variables included are available from the authors upon request. 
  
5. Results 
The first column of Table 2 displays the results of the OLS-HAC estimation of Equation 
1. As the table shows, the coefficient estimate associated with intervention is 
insignificant, i.e. we find no evidence that intervention, on average, has an intraday 
influence on the exchange rate spread. Clearly, this seems at odds with the existing 
intraday studies of intervention and spreads who all find that foreign exchange 
intervention is associated with an intraday increase in the bid-ask exchange rate spread 
                                                 
20
 The results of the daily data analysis of intervention in ERM I by Brandner, Grech and Stix (2006) show 
that the distance from parity significantly influences the level of the DKK/DEM exchange rate. In the 
context of intraday data and intervention in ERM II, Fatum and Pedersen (2009) find no significant effects 
of either distance from parity or the EUR-DKK interest rate differential on the level of the DKK/DEM 
exchange rate. The intraday analysis of intervention and spreads by Melvin, Menkhoff and Schmeling 
(2009) includes two lags of both spread and volatility in some of their estimations. Their results in regards 
to intervention are not affected regardless of whether lags of spreads and volatility are included. 
21
 When we consider the distance from the DKK/EUR rate to the sample mean of the DKK/EUR rate we 
find evidence that the further away from the sample mean the larger is the bid-ask spread. Inclusion of this 
alternative distance measure does not influence the results with respect to the intervention variables. 
 13 
(see Chari 2007; Melvin, Menkhoff and Schmeling, 2009; and Pasquariello 2007).
22
 We 
discuss our findings and why they might differ from those of the existing literature after 
presenting the results of the analysis that allows for the possibility asymmetric effects 
across intervention purchases and sales. 
To test for such intervention asymmetries we estimate the baseline model with 
intervention purchases and sales entering as separate variables (as described in Equation 
2). The results, displayed in the second column of Table 2, show that contemporaneous 
intervention purchases of DKK as well as contemporaneous intervention sales of DKK 
are significant (at 95% and 90%, respectively) but influence the exchange rate spread in 
opposite directions. Specifically, intervention purchases of the small currency decrease 
the exchange rate spread while intervention sales of the small currency increase the 
spread. 
Certainly, these results make clear the necessity of distinguishing between 
intervention purchases and intervention sales when assessing the influence of intervention 
on exchange rate spreads, at least in our context of unannounced intervention in a 
horizontal band. Moreover, the results corroborate the idea that unannounced 
interventions, of which the foreign exchange market customers cannot know the origin 
and, therefore, observe only as large order flows, affect the perception of the market 
regarding whether there is pressure on a currency and in which direction. The 
interpretation of a large sale of the small currency as an indication of the relatively more 
                                                 
22
 The lack of significance of intervention, on average, is also at odds with Naranjo and Nimalendran 
(2000) who, in the context of intervention in the DEM/USD market over the 1976 to 1994 period, find that 
intervention, on average, increases the spread. Their analysis, however, pertains to daily data on 
intervention in a floating exchange rate over an 18 year period during which intervention occurs on almost 
a third of the trading days in their sample (intervention occurs on 1512 of their 4723 trading days under 
study). Therefore, their data and context are substantially different from ours thus it does not seem 
meaningful to further compare our findings to theirs. 
 14 
concerning downward pressure within the horizontal band increases market uncertainty 
and widens the spread. By contrast, the interpretation of a large purchase of the small 
currency as an indication of upward pressure is a confirmation of the exchange rate 
regime in the sense that the lower bound is less likely to be tested and, as a result, market 
uncertainty decreases and the spread narrows. 
Since no previous study has investigated the influence of intervention on 
exchange rate spreads in the context of the horizontal ERM II band, we compare our 
findings to existing studies of intervention and spreads with caution. That said, it is 
nevertheless interesting to note that our results are, upon closer inspection, consistent 
with the findings of both Chari (2007) and Melvin, Menkhoff and Schmeling (2009). 
Their samples consist of only intervention sales (intervention sales of JPY and RUB, 
respectively, against USD), thus by nature of their intervention data they do not consider 
the influence of intervention purchases. They find that intervention sales of the smaller 
currency increase the spread, as do we. This could suggest that the downward pressure 
concern manifests itself not only in our context of the horizontal ERM II band, but also in 
other exchange rate systems such as floating rates. More research, such as analyzing the 
intraday effects of intervention purchases of JPY, is warranted in order to answer whether 
intervention asymmetries are present in, say, floating rates. 
Unlike the intervention data studied by Chari (2007) and Melvin, Menkhoff and 
Schmeling (2009), the Swiss intraday intervention data investigated by Pasquariello 
(2007) contains both purchases and sales. Contrary to the insignificant intervention 
coefficient of our preliminary analysis that does not distinguish between purchases and 
sales, he finds that intervention, on average, increases the intraday spread. However, 
 15 
Pasquariello (2007) also shows that intervention sales of the CHF exert a stronger 
influence on the CHF/USD spread than intervention purchases of the CHF. Our results, 
therefore, are consistent with his in terms of intervention sales of the smaller currency 
increasing the spread and in terms of showing that the effects on the spread of 
intervention purchases and sales are asymmetric. By contrast, our results differ in regards 
to whether intervention purchases of the small currency decrease the spread, as in our 
data, or whether intervention purchases merely increase the spread less than intervention 
sales, as in Pasquariello (2007). We conjecture that this difference is due to the fact that 
our context is that of unannounced intervention in a horizontal band while the Swiss 
interventions are announced and carried out in a floating exchange rate regime. Only in 
our context can a purchase of the small currency be interpreted by the market as a 
confirmation of the credibility of the band which, as we suggest, is the reason why 
intervention purchases reduce market uncertainty and narrow the spread.
23
 
Lastly, it is also particularly interesting to relate our findings to those of Fatum 
and Pedersen (2009) since doing so allows us to assess whether the effects of the DN 
interventions are consistent with the noise-trading channel. Fatum and Pedersen (2009) 
find that intervention sales of DKK significantly depreciate the DKK while intervention 
purchases of DKK have no detectable effect on the level of the DKK/EUR rate. Our 
findings in conjunction with those of Fatum and Pedersen (2009) thus suggest that 
interventions that cause the spread to widen also induce a significant adjustment of the 
DKK/EUR exchange rate level, whereas interventions that cause the spread to narrow do 
not. As noted earlier, in order for intervention to be effective in influencing relative 
                                                 
23
 The CHF is a widely traded safe-haven currency while the DKK is not. We therefore compare the details 
of our findings to those of Pasquariello (2007) with particular caution. 
 16 
currency values through the noise-trading channel, intervention must be associated with 
an increase in market uncertainty. Although not a formal validation of the noise-trading 
channel, our findings in conjunction with those of Fatum and Pedersen (2009) are clearly 
consistent with the transmission mechanism described by the noise-trading channel. 
 
6. Robustness 
In order to test the robustness of our results we model the intraday periodicity of the bid-
ask spread, re-estimate the baseline model using a different econometric procedure, take 
into account the possibility that the intervention variables contain expected components, 
control for macro news surprises, include lags and leads of the intervention variables, test 
for structural breaks, and consider the position as well as the short-term trend of the 
exchange rate at the time of intervention. Results pertaining to intraday periodicity, 
delayed effects, lead effects, break point test, the exchange rate position and trend are not 
shown for brevity but available from the authors upon request.  
First, to ensure that our intervention coefficient estimates are not biased from 
ignoring the possibility of intraday periodicity in the bid-ask spread, we re-estimate the 
conditional mean models described in Equations (1) and (2) with a Flexible Fourier Form 
included (see Gallant 1981). While the results indicate that intraday periodicity is present 
in the spread, the baseline results regarding the intraday influence of intervention on the 
spread are unaffected by the inclusion of the Flexible Fourier Form. 
Second, we re-estimate the models described in Equations (1) and (2) using the 
weighted least squares (WLS) procedure developed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). 
The results of the conditional mean estimations, displayed in Table 3 (the first column 
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shows the results of the preliminary estimation that does not allow for asymmetries and 
the second column shows the results using separate intervention purchases and sales 
variables), are virtually identical to those of the OLS-HAC estimations. The intervention 
variable described in Equation (1) is, again, insignificant while both intervention 
variables (purchases and sales) described in Equation (2) are, again, significant and of 
opposite signs. The only difference is that the WLS estimation results are marginally 
stronger in the sense that both intervention sales and intervention purchases are now 
significant at the 95% level compared to the OLS-HAC estimations (Table 2) where 
intervention sales are significant at 95% and intervention purchases are significant at only 
90%. 
 Third, while there is no reason to believe that intervention is triggered by the 
contemporaneous exchange rate spread (i.e. the change in the exchange rate spread that 
occurs over the 5-minute interval within which intervention is carried out), intervention is 
nevertheless correlated with recent (lagged) exchange rate movements and with recent 
(lagged) intervention, even at the intraday frequency.
24
 We follow Humpage (1999) and 
others by estimating a central bank reaction function and, in turn, use the residuals of the 
reaction function to replace the actual intervention variable in our empirical models of the 
exchange rate spread. This procedure ensures that any component of intervention that is 
easily predictable, i.e. captured by the reaction function estimation, is not leading to a 
bias of the estimated effects on the exchange rate spread. The results of estimating the 
effects of the reaction function generated intervention variable on the spread are 
displayed in Table 4 (the first column shows the results when all interventions are 
contained in one variable while the second column shows the results using separate 
                                                 
24
 See Neely (2001, 2008) for useful insights on what prompts central bank intervention. 
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intervention sales and purchases variables). As the table shows, the results are 
qualitatively identical to the comparable results from estimations that do not employ the 
intervention variable generated from the residuals of the intervention reaction function.
25
 
Fourth, to ensure that our estimated effects of intervention are not tainted by the 
coincidental arrival of macro news, we extend our analysis to include time-stamped 
Danish, German, and Euro-area macro surprises. This is important because macro 
surprises can change the perception of the market in regards to whether a currency is 
properly aligned with fundamentals, i.e. we need to make sure that what we label the 
reaction of the market to unannounced interventions is not in actuality a matter of the 
market adjusting to unexpected macro news. To address this concern we include macro 
surprises regarding Danish Unemployment (DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), 
Current Account (DKCA), CPI (DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP) and Consumer Confidence 
(DKCC); German IFO Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Industrial Production 
(DEIP); Euro-Area CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production (EAIP), and Business Climate 
Index (EABC).  Macro surprises are measured as the difference between macro 
announcement and preceding survey expectation. To facilitate a comparison of the 
relative influence of macro news and interventions, all macro and intervention variables 
are standardized (i.e. we divide each variable by its sample standard deviation).
 
The 
results of the estimations with macro surprises included, displayed in Table 5, show that 
                                                 
25
 The daily data literature on central bank reaction functions generally obtains a reasonable goodness of fit 
(see, for example, Ito and Yabu 2007 who model daily interventions carried out by the Japanese 
authorities). However, in our context of modeling the Danish interventions at the intraday frequency we are 
unable to achieve a reaction function R
2
 above 1%. The low goodness of fit suggests that the intraday 
timing of the Danish interventions is largely unpredictable and, consequently, that the actual intervention 
variable and the intervention variable generated from the residuals of the intervention reaction function 
estimation are very similar. It is therefore unsurprising that replacing the actual intervention variable in the 
baseline model with the reaction function residuals yields identical results. 
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some of the macro surprises influence the spread. More importantly, the results regarding 
the asymmetric effects of intervention purchases and sales remain.
26
 
Fifth, in order to test for delayed effects of intervention, we re-estimate our 
models described in Equations 1 and 2 with 12 lags (60 minutes) of both intervention 
purchases and intervention sales included. The results show no systematic pattern of 
delayed effects and the cumulative sums of lags are all insignificant. Moreover, the 
previously discussed asymmetric contemporaneous effects of intervention purchases and 
sales, respectively, are unchanged. 
Sixth, we address the possibility that the market anticipates and, therefore, reacts 
in advance of the interventions by testing for the presence of lead effects. Specifically, we 
add two (10 minutes) and, subsequently, six leads (30 minutes) of intervention purchases 
and intervention sales to the models in Equations 1 and 2. None of the leads is 
individually significant and, moreover, the respective sums of leads (two or six leads) are 
not significantly different from zero. 
Seventh, to ensure that our parameter estimates are valid across the entire sample 
period we employ the Andrews (1993) test for unknown break point. The test does not 
detect any evidence of a break point and, therefore, we accept the hypothesis of 
parameter stability across our sample.
27
 
                                                 
26
 Interestingly, the relative influence of intervention is generally quite small compared to the relative 
influence of macro news. This is, however, not surprising considering that, as previously discussed, the 
Danish interventions are carried out to confirm the commitment of the Danish exchange rate policy rather 
than to calm disorderly markets, or to bring about substantial changes in the DKK/EUR exchange rate. 
27
The institutional framework of the ERM II stipulates that the European Central Bank is obligated to 
intervene if the ERM II currency reaches either the upper or the lower limit of the deviation band. An 
increase in currency reserves held by the ERM II central bank should, therefore, not necessarily influence 
the credibility of the ERM II target zone or how intervention affects the exchange rate market. It is thus not 
surprising that the Andrews (1993) test for structural break rejects the presence of a break despite the fact 
that the stock of Danish foreign currency reserves more than doubled from 2002 to 2004.  
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Eighth, we test whether interventions that occur when the DKK/EUR rate is 
relatively far away from its sample mean are more (or less) influential by adding to the 
baseline model two interactive dummy variables that equal |I
P
t| and |I
S
t|, respectively, 
when either I
P
t and I
S
t, respectively, occur when the DKK/EUR rate is at least two 
standard deviations away from its sample mean. Our results suggest that intervention 
sales of DKK increase the spread and intervention purchases of DKK decrease the spread 
(our baseline result) and that these effects are more pronounced if the interventions occur 
at a time when the exchange rate is relatively far away from its sample mean.  
Ninth and final, to consider the possibility that the preceding short-term exchange 
rate movement is a factor in determining the extent to which interventions are influential 
we first define leaning with the wind interventions as interventions carried out in the 
same direction as the immediately preceding 1-hour exchange rate trend. We then add to 
the baseline model two interactive dummy variables (“slope-shifters”) that take on the 
value of |I
P
t| and |I
S
t|, respectively, when leaning with the wind intervention purchases and 
sales occur (and zero otherwise). The results of estimating the augmented model confirm 
the findings regarding the asymmetric effects on the exchange rate spread across 
intervention purchases and intervention sales. The results also show that both slope-
shifters are insignificant. These findings are repeated when we define leaning with the 
wind interventions according to the immediately preceding 9-hour (the duration of a 
business day) exchange rate movement. Accordingly, we find no evidence that the 
immediately preceding short-term exchange rate movement is a factor in determining the 
extent to which interventions are influential. 
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7. Conclusion 
The existing literature on intervention and spreads is very scarce, and it does not consider 
intervention in a horizontal band such as the ERM II. Our study is the first to analyze the 
intraday effects of intra-marginal intervention on the exchange rate spread in the context 
of a horizontal ERM II band. Proprietary data on official Danish intervention transactions 
in the DKK/EUR exchange rate market facilitates our analysis.  
It is interesting to investigate how the exchange rate spread is influenced by 
intervention because doing so can reveal whether intervention affects foreign exchange 
market uncertainty. It is particularly interesting to study the Danish intervention 
experience in ERM II since it can provide valuable insights of relevance to not only 
Denmark but also to the currently 8 EU member states that have not yet adopted the EUR 
but are legally required to do so at some point in time. These 8 EU member states, 
therefore, are either already participating in the ERM II or expected to participate in the 
ERM II at a later date prior to joining the Euro-area. 
Our time-series estimations of the 5-minute DKK/EUR exchange rate bid-ask 
spread provide two insights. First, we show that failure to allow for the possibility of 
asymmetric affects across intervention purchases and intervention sales can lead to 
failure to detect the influence of intervention. This is a result of general interest as it 
illustrates the necessity of considering asymmetries when assessing the influence of large 
trades, such as intervention transactions, in foreign exchange rate markets.  
Second, we show that intervention purchases and sales in a horizontal ERM II 
band both significantly influence the spread, but the direction of the intervention matters 
for the resolution, or creation, of uncertainty in the market. Specifically, we show that 
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intervention purchases of the ERM II currency, on average, reduce the spread while 
intervention sales of the ERM II currency, on average, increase the spread.  
This is a new and interesting result that differs from those of existing studies that 
find intervention to increase market uncertainty regardless of the direction of the 
intervention. It is also a finding of practical relevance to authorities with the mandate to 
carry out interventions in the context of a horizontal band. Contrary to findings of studies 
analyzing intervention in floating exchange rates that, regardless of the exchange rate 
level or volatility effects of intervention, show that intervention is costly because it 
increases market uncertainty, we show that this is not necessarily the case. Instead, 
depending on the direction of intervention, we show that intervention can, in fact, reduce 
market uncertainty. Lastly, our result has implications for hedge funds and other 
speculators that may profit when spreads widen or narrow with intervention in a 
predictable manner. 
The institutional framework surrounding intervention in a horizontal ERM II band 
is markedly different from that of intervention in other exchange rate regimes such as, for 
example, floating rates. Therefore, we can not infer that our results describe the intraday 
effects of intervention on the exchange rate spread in general, i.e. regardless of the 
specifics of the exchange rate system within which the interventions occur. Rather, our 
study encourages additional research in order to assess the extent to which our findings 
also describe the influence of intervention on the exchange rate spread in the context of 
other exchange rate systems. 
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Figure 1 
 
Notes: 
a) Data Sources: Danmarks Nationalbank (interventions) and Olsen and Associates 
(exchange rates) 
b) A positive intervention is a purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK; a negative 
intervention is a sale of EUR against a purchase of DKK; the interventions are plotted 
against the central parity of 7.46038 DKK/EUR 
c) The exchange rate is the 5 min. spot exchange rate; the upper and lower lines are the 
ERM II deviation bands 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
Notes: 
a) Data Source: Olsen and Associates and own calculations 
b) The spread is defined as bid minus ask price and measured in PIPS 
c) PIPS are defined as 0.01DKK per 100EUR 
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TABLE 1A                                    Intervention Summary Statistics 
 
Number of 
Interventions 
Average amount 
(mill. EUR) 
Daily interventions 
All 73 155 
Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK 52 144 
Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK 21 182 
Intraday interventions 
All 162 70 
Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK 99 76 
Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK 63 61 
 
NOTES: 
Data source: Danmarks Nationalbank 
Sample period: 1 August 2002 to 31 December 2004 
 
 
TABLE 1B   Summary Statistics for 5 Minute DKK/EUR Exchange Rate Spreads 
Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
2.1 
(~0.1) 
3.4 
(-) 
2.7586 
(0.0097) 
10.4709** 
(0.0193) 
Minimum Maximum 
BJ-test for 
normality LB Q-test (5-day lag) 
0 
 
31.0 
 
 
231372*** 
 [5.9915] 
138172*** 
[3.8415] 
 
NOTES:   
Data source: Olsen and Associates 
Sample period: 1 August 2002 to 31 December 2004 
The data consists of 64383 observations of DKK/EUR exchange rate bid- and ask 
prices 
The exchange rate spreads are calculated as ask minus bid prices and measured in 
PIPS 
PIPS are defined as 0.01DKK per 100EUR 
* Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; critical values in [ ] 
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TABLE 2          Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Intervention 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention Purchases 
and Sales 
Constant (e-5) 
 
)0(    0.002*** 
 (0.0001) 
 0.002*** 
 (0.0001) 
Interventions (e-5) 
 
)0(  1.93 
(1.76) 
- 
Intervention Sales of  EUR/Purchases of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(S  
- -2.30** 
 (1.07) 
Intervention Purchases of  EUR/Sales of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(P  
- 4.92* 
(2.63) 
Lags of FX-spreads 
 
)1(  0.34*** 
 (0.010) 
0.34*** 
 (0.009) 
)2(  0.20*** 
 (0.008) 
0.20*** 
 (0.008) 
)3(  0.12*** 
 (0.008) 
0.12*** 
 (0.008) 
)4(  0.09*** 
 (0.008) 
0.09*** 
 (0.008) 
)5(  0.07*** 
 (0.009) 
0.07*** 
 (0.009) 
)6(  0.08*** 
(0.007) 
0.08*** 
(0.007) 
R2 0.60 0.60 
 
#Interventions 
 
162 
 
- 
#Intervention Sales 
of EUR 
- 63 
#Interventions 
Purchases of EUR 
- 99 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; lags in ( ) in Variable Name 
(c)    Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances 
(d)    Column 1 displays the estimation results pertaining to Equation (1) in the 
text; column 2 displays the estimation results pertaining to Equation (2) in the text 
(e)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread  
(f)    The independent variables are contemporaneous intervention, and lags of the 
dependent variable 
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TABLE 3          Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Intervention: 
                          WLS Conditional Mean Equation 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention Purchases 
and Sales 
Constant (e-5) 
 
)0(    0.002*** 
 (0.0001) 
 0.002*** 
 (0.0001) 
Interventions (e-5) 
 
)0(  0.81 
(1.28) 
- 
Intervention Sales of  EUR/Purchases of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(S  
- -2.59** 
 (1.22) 
Intervention Purchases of  EUR/Sales of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(P  
- 4.35**  
(2.18) 
Lags of FX-spreads 
 
)1(  0.33*** 
 (0.008) 
0.34*** 
 (0.009) 
)2(  0.19*** 
 (0.007) 
0.20*** 
 (0.008) 
)3(  0.12*** 
 (0.007) 
0.12*** 
 (0.008) 
)4(  0.10*** 
 (0.007) 
0.09*** 
 (0.008) 
)5(  0.07*** 
 (0.007) 
0.06*** 
 (0.008) 
)6(  0.08*** 
(0.006) 
0.08*** 
(0.007) 
 
#Interventions 
 
162 
 
- 
#Intervention Sales 
of EUR 
- 63 
#Interventions 
Purchases of EUR 
- 99 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; lags in ( ) in Variable Name 
(c)    Estimations are defined in Equation (2) in the text, and carried out using 
WLS 
(d)    Column 1 displays the estimation results of the conditional mean model 
defined in Equation (1) in the text; column 2 displays the estimation results of the 
conditional mean model defined in Equation (2) in the text 
(e)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread  
(f)    The independent variables are contemporaneous intervention, and lags of the 
dependent variable 
(g)     R2 is not applicable to the WLS estimation procedure 
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TABLE 4    Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Unexpected Intervention 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention 
Purchases and Sales 
 
Constant (e-5) 
)0(   0.002*** 
 (0.0001) 
0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
 
Unexpected Interventions (e-5) 
)0(U  
1.94 
 (1.76) 
- 
Unexpected Intervention Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK (e-5) 
 
)0(US  
- -2.36** 
(1.08) 
Unexpected Intervention Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK  (e-5) 
 
)0(UP  
- 4.99* 
(2.66) 
R2 0.60 0.60 
#Interventions 162 - 
#Intervention Sales 
of EUR 
- 63 
#Interventions 
Purchases of EUR 
- 99 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** 
denotes significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates 
(c)    Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances 
(d)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread 
(e)    Column 1: The independent variables are contemporaneous unexpected 
intervention (denoted by subscript U) and lags of the dependent variable. 
Column 2: The independent variables are contemporaneous unexpected 
intervention sales of EUR (denoted by subscript US), contemporaneous 
unexpected intervention purchases of EUR (denoted by subscript UP), and 
lags of the dependent variable 
 (f)     Unexpected intervention is proxied by the residual of an auxiliary 
intervention reaction function estimation 
(g)     The coefficient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of the 
dependent variable are not shown for ease of exposition 
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TABLE 5                  Exchange Rate Spread Responses to Intervention  
                                  and Macro News 
  
All Interventions 
Separate Intervention 
Purchases and Sales 
Standardized Intervention All 
 
)0(SD  
0.0017 
(0.0016) - 
Standardized Intervention Sales of EUR/Purchases of DKK 
 
)0(SDS  - 
-0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
Standardized Intervention Purchases of EUR/Sales of DKK 
 
)0(SDP  - 
0.0022* 
(0.0012) 
Standardized Danish Macro News 
 
DKUNEMP(0) 0.0108* 
(0.0060) 
0.0108* 
(0.0060) 
DKUNEMP(1) 0.00102* 
(0.0044) 
0.0102** 
(0.0044) 
DKTB(0) 0.0045 
(0.0041) 
0.0045 
(0.0041) 
DKTB(1) -0.0035** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0035** 
(0.0021) 
DKCA(0) -0.0112*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0112*** 
(0.0035) 
DKCA(1) -0.0044 
(0.0043) 
-0.0044 
(0.0043) 
DKCPI(0) 0.0138 
(0.0150) 
0.0138 
(0.0150) 
DKCPI(1)  -0.0048 
(0.0078) 
-0.0048 
(0.0078) 
DKGDP(0) -0.0085 
(0.0099) 
-0.0085 
(0.0099) 
DKGDP(1) -0.0274*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0274*** 
(0.0054) 
DKCC(0) 0.0120*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0120** 
(0.0049) 
DKCC(1) -0.0065** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0029) 
Standardized German Macro News 
 
DEIFO(0) -0.0101*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0038) 
DEIFO(1) 0.0018 
(0.0045) 
0.0018 
(0.0045) 
DEGDP(0) -0.0155*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.0026) 
DEGDP(1) -0.0057*** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0020) 
DEIP(0) 0.0035 
(0.0033) 
0.0035 
(0.0033) 
DEIP(1) 0.0070 
(0.0075) 
0.0070 
(0.0075) 
Standardized Euro-Area Macro News 
 
EACPI(0) -0.0053 
(0.0058) 
-0.0053 
(0.0058) 
EACPI(1) 0.0044 
(0.0033) 
0.0044 
(0.0033) 
EAIP(0) 0.0029 
(0.0031) 
0.0029 
(0.0031) 
EAIP(1) -0.0023 
(0.0023) 
-0.0023 
(0.0023) 
EABC(0) -0.0355 -0.0355 
 32 
(0.0242) (0.0243) 
EABC(1) 0.0134 
 (0.0098) 
0.0134 
(0.0098) 
R2 0.60 0.60 
#Interventions 162 - 
#Intervention Sales of 
EUR 
- 63 
#Interventions 
Purchases of EUR 
- 99 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** denotes significance at 95%, *** denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; lags in ( ) in Variable 
Names 
(c)     Estimations are carried out using OLS with heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors and covariances 
(d)    The dependent variable is the DKK/EUR exchange rate spread.  
(e)    The independent variables are contemporaneous standardized intervention 
sales of EUR (denoted by subscript SDS), contemporaneous standardized 
intervention purchases of EUR (denoted by subscript SDP), contemporaneous 
and lagged standardized macro news, and  lags of the dependent variable 
(f)     Macro news variables capture news surprises as the difference between 
actual announcement and survey expectations extracted from Bloomberg. The 
estimations take into account news regarding Danish Unemployment 
(DKUNEMP), Trade Balance (DKTB), Current Account (DKCA), CPI 
(DKCPI), GDP (DKGDP), and Consumer Confidence (DKCC); German IFO 
Index (DEIFO), GDP (DEGDP), and Industrial Production (DEIP); Euro-Area 
CPI (EACPI), Industrial Production (EAIP), and Business Climate Index 
(EABC). 
(g)   All variables are standardized by dividing each variable by its respective 
sample standard deviation 
(h)   The coefficient estimates associated with the constant and the lags of the 
dependent variable not shown for ease of exposition 
 
 
